Foundational Land Capital
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FOUNDATIONAL LAND CAPITAL
CONFIDENTIAL · DISCUSSION DOCUMENT
Land-secured private credit

Land Is Next.


A land credit platform — first-lien private credit secured by land, originated and underwritten by Foundational Land Capital.

SEPTEMBER 2026
NOT AN OFFER OF SECURITIES OR A COMMITMENT TO LEND
01
Executive summary

A land credit platform, sized to a pipeline that already exists.


  • The gap is regulatory, not cyclical. Supervisory LTV limits of 65% on raw land and 75% on land development have not moved since 1992. A bank cannot price its way past them; it spends scarce balance-sheet allowance to make one land loan.
  • The market prices it. Land is the highest-rate, lowest-leverage property type measured — 7.50% and 60.3% LTV across 97 transactions at 700+ institutions in Q2 2026.
  • FLC is the operator seat. National off-market origination, an in-production underwriting standard, live servicing, and the capability to complete a project as principal if a borrower fails.
  • The proposal. A joint-venture land credit platform, originated and underwritten by FLC and co-sponsored with an institutional capital partner. $50M Phase I, defined path to $250M.
24.0%
Base-case gross yield on $50M
16.8%
Base partner yield, net of cost
12.8%
Downside partner yield
8.0%
Preferred return
6 / 0
Facilities funded / defaults
$5.0M
Wish Family Office seed
Basis

Illustrative economics on $50M deployed, net of a 3% platform operating cost; gross asset yields before credit loss. Market pricing: 97 closed transactions at 700+ institutions, Q2 2026. Figures are estimates on stated assumptions.

02
The pattern

Every cycle institutionalizes one scattered asset class. Land is the one still waiting.


  • The playbook is familiar. Single-family rental was too scattered to institutionalize — until someone built the machinery. Fix-and-flip bridge was the same. Residential transition lending followed.
  • Land is the last major real-estate collateral class still financed the way everything else was financed twenty years ago: locally, one deal at a time, on relationships and estimates rather than on data and specification.
  • The thing that changes an asset class is not more capital chasing it — it is one operator building national origination, a repeatable underwriting standard, and the ability to take an asset over. That is what turns a pile of one-off loans into a program.

Why it stays open

Banks are held out of land by supervisory limits, not by appetite. The gap is structural, and it does not close when credit conditions ease.


The opportunity is land lending. The vehicle is a platform that already operates in it — Foundational Land Capital.

03
The opportunity

The gap is regulatory, not cyclical.


Loan category (Interagency guidelines)Supervisory LTV limit
Raw land65%
Land development75%
Construction — 1-to-4 family85%
Improved property85%

Source: Interagency Real Estate Lending Guidelines, supervisory LTV table.

  • The two lowest limits in the entire table sit on raw land and land development, and a bank's book of exception loans is capped against total capital.
  • A bank cannot price its way to a higher-leverage land loan. It has to spend a scarce balance-sheet allowance to make one. That constraint has not moved since 1992.
  • We do not claim banks have retreated from land. That claim does not survive diligence — the median bank grew construction balances over the year. The argument is structural, not sentimental.
04
The opportunity

The market prices the constraint exactly as theory predicts.


Property typeAvg rateAvg LTV 
Owner-occupied CRE6.00%73.0%
Mobile home park6.36%71.0%
Storage6.50%71.7%
Multifamily6.57%72.7%
Hospitality7.10%66.1%
Land7.50%60.3%

Land carries the highest rate and the lowest leverage of any property type measured. The gap is not in operating land assets — a stabilized park or storage facility finances near 71% LTV. The gap is in the dirt before it becomes one.

Source

97 closed transactions at 700+ institutions, Q2 2026. Bar length scales to average LTV.

05
The opportunity

Institutional capital has validated the land above us. No one has organized the credit below it.


Land banking, already institutional

PGIM × Domain Real Estate Partners~$4.0B
Guggenheim × Bedrock Land Finance$5.0B target
Blue Owl × FivePointup to $1.7B
Walton — Builder Land Finance Fund III$250M

Capital has validated residential land as an asset class — serving national homebuilders through land banking.

Where FLC operates

First-lien credit to the operators who create the use in the first place — a regional builder putting up forty homes a year, a manufactured-home operator setting twenty-five units a month, a mitigation banker running approved instruments. Established, profitable businesses.

What none of them has is a land department and a balance sheet willing to carry ground. So we find the parcel off-market, comp it, and fund it. They build. We carry the ground. The lender who will not touch the ground stage takes us out.

06
The platform

A vertically integrated land credit platform — and the deal flow is the scarce input.


  • Origination. National off-market parcel sourcing and scoring on a proprietary parcel-data platform. Deals arrive already scoped, not brokered to us.
  • Underwriting. LTV measured against independently comped value — never purchase price, list price or borrower estimate. Terrain verified on SSURGO and USGS 3DEP; access verified as polygon and abutter chain, never a vendor field.
  • Servicing. Borrower intake portal into an underwriter queue, document management and role-gated decisioning. Live since July 2026.
  • Operator capability. We acquire, entitle, subdivide and sell land as principal. A defaulted loan becomes a project we already know how to finish — the capability that separates a land lender from a land credit platform.
The engine, in numbers
Transactions since 2020
1,400
Operator network
431 entities
States covered
21
Comparable records
~4,000
Active portal subscribers
263
Servicing live
Jul 2026

A credit desk can underwrite a land loan. It cannot manufacture national off-market land deal flow — the part that cannot be replicated by hiring.

07
Track record

Six funded first-lien facilities, six states, zero defaults.


FacilityPrincipalTotal backPoints + interest
Lincoln County, OK$368,000$421,899$90,699
Clayton County, IA$250,000$277,247$52,247
Sevier County, TN$150,000$160,948$25,948
Doña Ana County, NM$100,000$107,989$17,989
Baraga County, MI$85,000$94,935$18,435
Merrimack County, NH$45,000$49,771$9,271
Total$998,000$1,112,789$214,589
$134K
Points + accrued interest earned in four months

House standard 10 points plus 18%. No facility has completed a full repayment cycle; first payoffs are Dec 2026 to Feb 2027. Six facilities with no defaults is not statistical evidence, and we do not present it as such.

08
Credit

A modelled loss expectation, not six clean loans.


We start from the adverse literature. FDIC research on $39B of acquisition, development and construction loans from 289 failed banks (2008–2013) found land and lot lending the worst-performing segment of the worst-performing CRE category of the last cycle. Four structural differences separate this platform from that cohort:

Leverage basis. That cohort lent against a development budget at high loan-to-cost. We lend against independently comped value: ceiling 120%, target 50–80%.
Exit structure. Those were single-exit loans. Ours amortize through partial releases — one anchor position retires 88% of principal on five of eleven lots.
Completion capability. The cohort was, by definition, lenders who could not finish a project and liquidated into a distressed market. We complete land projects as principal.
Jurisdiction. The credit box excludes CA, NV, NY and NJ; our funded states average 2 to 7 months to foreclose.
70–200 bps
Modelled annual credit cost

A 2–4% annual default rate at 35–50% severity — against a 24.0% base-case gross yield, absorbable with margin, and set deliberately above current experience (FDIC aggregate net charge-offs 0.63%), because benign conditions are when the worst loans get written.

09
Strategy

Four lanes with live counterparties, sized to deployable pipeline.


Origination laneAllocationDebt onlyBaseUpside
Land flips & minor subdivisions
Flagship vertical · severable collateral, 9–12 month self-liquidating cycles
$12M30.0%31.5%40.0%
Manufactured & modular land-home
Live counterparty in North Carolina · the unfunded land half of the cost stack
$10M19.5%28.0%36.4%
Smaller regional homebuilders
Representative partner in New Hampshire · we are the builder's land department
$10M13.3%22.0%35.5%
Conservation & species mitigation
Live counterparty in Florida · demand driven by federal obligations, counter-cyclical
$8M13.5%15.5%24.5%
Other mapped verticals (MHC, storage, battery, RV, franchise pads, institutional)$10M15.0%19.0%27.0%
Weighted blend$50M18.9%23.8%33.3%
Basis

Yields debt-only / base / upside, annualised, built bottom-up from each partner's own unit economics. Holds are short, so points and participation annualise across roughly two turns a year. Allocation is dynamic and follows the parcels the market presents; the parcel decides the partner, not the reverse.

10
Economics

The first-lien book carries the waterfall on its own.


CaseGross yieldNet of opexPartner yield
Downside
coupon and points only, no participation anywhere
19.0%16.0%12.8%
Base24.0%21.0%16.8%
Upside33.4%30.4%24.3%

On $50M deployed, net of a 3.0% all-in platform operating cost. If no profit participation ever pays and the platform earns nothing but contractual coupon and points, capital partners still clear 12.8% against an 8% preferred return.

Distribution waterfall
1 · Return of capital
100%
2 · Preferred return
8% compounded
3 · Catch-up
50 / 50
4 · Promote
80 / 20

JV equity, not a loan to the operator. FLC co-invests as a minority partner, so its capital sits on the same footing as the institutional partner's. Indicative.

11
Deal study · land flip / minor subdivision

Lincoln County, Oklahoma: severable collateral in practice.

FUNDED

A $368,000 first-lien facility funded April 2026 against about $312,000 of borrower cost, at house terms of 10 points plus 18%. The parcel was subdivided into eleven legal lots — administrative in this jurisdiction, no plat or infrastructure obligation. Value is the spread between wholesale and retail, not appreciation.

Five lots under accepted offer
$325,000
= share of loan principal
88%
Six unsold lots behind the position
$359,400
Aggregate asking vs. principal
1.9×
Total back at payoff (~10 mo)
$421,899
~30%
Annualised return · points and coupon only

Principal amortizes through partial releases long before the final lot sells. Recovery does not depend on a single exit, a single buyer, or a single point in the cycle. No participation is modelled on this position.

12
Team

Underwriting sits structurally apart from origination and capital.


Nate Wish
Founder
Founder and operator of Foundational Land Capital and HW Development Group; acquires, entitles, subdivides and sells land as principal nationally. Carries a family structured-finance pedigree — Ocwen Financial (NYSE: OCN), Oxford Financial Group and Kidder, Peabody & Co.
Chris Graeve
Capital & operations
Capital formation, credit policy and organizational build. Counter-cyclical posture: "the worst loans are made in the best of times, and the inverse is also true."
Ashley Perrine
Underwriting
Owns the credit file on every facility, with independent authority to decline or resize any transaction without sign-off — including transactions already recommended for approval.
Origination partnership
Sourcing front end
A national land origination platform with 1,400 closed transactions since 2020 and a 431-entity operator network across 21 states, integrated as the platform's sourcing front end.

The credit-file owner can decline or resize any transaction without sign-off. That structural separation between underwriting and origination has already produced reversals on transactions recommended for approval.

Note

Individual biographies to be finalized. Wish-family financial record verified via SEC and public profiles.

13
The proposal

A $50M land credit platform, with a defined path to $250M.


  • The ask. Co-sponsor a joint-venture land credit platform with an institutional capital partner — first-lien loans secured by land, originated and underwritten by FLC.
  • FLC contributes. National off-market origination, underwriting, live servicing, borrower relationships across ten mapped verticals, and the operator capability to complete any project taken back.
  • The partner contributes. Sponsor capital, institutional capital relationships, fund administration, compliance, asset management and servicing infrastructure.
  • Deployment. $50M over an 18-month, six-quarter schedule anchored on facilities already underwritten; Phase II scales the larger-ticket lanes; Phase III reaches a $250M platform.

The endgame is a defined 3–5 year path to public-market liquidity — a SPAC listing that consolidates into an institutional credit platform such as Ready Capital, the arc Broadmark Realty Capital ran from private lender to NYSE-listed platform.

Phased scale
Phase I
$50M
Schedule
18 months
Phase III platform
$250M
FLC co-invest
Minority

We are not seeking capital to go find deals. We are declining underwritten, first-lien-securable transactions for want of balance sheet.


FOUNDATIONAL LAND CAPITAL

Nate Wish, Founder

14